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ABSTRACT.   Is it better for a seller who wants to auction multiple units to face many small bidders or few 
large bidders? Since multi-unit auction models usually have many equilibria, there are no theoretical predictions 
on the impact of the competition structure on the performance of a multi-unit auction (in terms of expected 
revenue and allocation efficiency). Our experimental results with uniform-price auctions support that with a 
constant competition degree (identical aggregate demand and supply), when the number of bidders increases 
while individual demand decreases, there is less strategic bidding (demand reduction). It leads to higher expected 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Multi-unit auctions (in which bidders are allowed to submit multiple price-quantity bids) are 
used in an increasing number of domains : the purchase of foreign exchange (Tenorio, 1999), 
electricity  markets  (Wolfram  1998),  the  sale  of  Treasury  securities  (Binmore  and 
Swierzbinski 2000), the sale of agricultural goods, etc. They could also be mobilized in other 
areas such as water buybacks in drought-threatened basins (Hailu and Thoyer, 2005). In a 
multi-unit auction, many items or units are put on sale simultaneously in a single round. If 
bidders have multi-unit demands (i.e. bidders have positive valuations for many units and thus 
are interested in winning more than one unit), they are allowed to submit many bids indicating 
the price they are willing to pay for each unit.
1 Multi-unit auctions are more flexible than 
auctions that limit bids to a single quantity-price pair bid and thus help to avoid the 'lumpy 
bid' problem inherent in single-bid auctions (Chan et al, 2003).  
 
The design of an auction seeks to maximize the competition between bidders in order to gain 
efficiency (both in terms of sale revenue and allocative efficiency). In auctions where each 
bidder is only interested in one unit, the competition degree can be easily measured by the 
ratio between the number of bidders and the number of units to be sold. In multi-unit auctions 
where bidders want more than one unit, the competition is not so easily defined. Although the 
competition  degree  can  be  measured  as  aggregate  demand  divided  by  total  supply,  the 
competition  structure  will  depend  on  the  number  of  bidders  and  the  structure  of  their 
individual demand. As a consequence and more generally, for a same competition degree, i.e. 
an identical aggregate demand and supply, we may have different competition structures. 
 
In practice, it may happen that the auctioneer has to select a target group to which the items 
will be sold (or purchased if it is a procurement auction). Of course, depending on the size of 
the group (the number of bidders) and the demand of each potential bidder in the group, the 
                                                 
1 In the auction literature, multi-unit auctions are sometimes formalized as share auctions in which the good is 
assumed  perfectly  divisible  and  bidders  submit  demand  functions  (see  Wilson,  1979and  Wang  and  Zender, 
2002). A multi-unit auction is a discrete version of a share auction.   3 
degree of competition will differ and it is expected that the auctioneer will choose the target 
group where the competition is greatest. 
 
Similarly, when the seller defines the size of a unit (the minimal indivisible quantity one can 
bid on and buy), she may also have an impact on the competition structure. Indeed, if the size 
of a unit is small enough, most potential buyers can participate on their own to the auction 
and, in this case, the bigger buyers will want many units. On the opposite, if the size of a unit 
is large, only the big bidders may be able to participate to the auction, unless the smaller 
buyers cooperate to bid together and then share their purchase.  
 
At stake for the auctioneer is to choose the market place and the size of the elementary unit 
sold, which will ensure the highest expected revenue (and/or potentially the highest allocative 
efficiency if the auctioneer is a public agency). Note that not only the size of the elementary 
unit but also the number of units may have an impact on the competition structure. See for 
example the case of the UMTS auctions where the number of licences on sale relative to the 
number of incumbents is crucial. 
 
The  objective  in  this  paper  is  to  compare  the  performance  of  multi-unit  auction  under 
different  structures  of  competition  when  bidders  have  private  independent  values.  More 
precisely,  for  an  identical  aggregate  demand,  is  it better  for the seller to face a group of 
numerous bidders who have small individual demands or a smaller group of bidders who have 
larger individual demands? What is best in terms of auction performance, i.e. seller’s revenue 
and allocation efficiency? 
 
We will focus on the case of uniform-price auction in which the stop-out price, i.e. the price 
paid by the winner(s), is the first rejected bid (or the highest losing bid).
2 Although structural 
properties  of  equilibrium  bidding  strategies  can  be  deducted  from  simple  examples,  the 
existing literature offers little insights into their analytical characterization, made intractable 
by the existence of multiple equilibria. Since theoretical analysis cannot provide a clear-cut 
                                                 
2 In a uniform-price auction, the stop-out price is sometimes defined as the lowest accepted bid. This different 
pricing rule can have substantial impacts on the bidders’ strategies and thus on the result of the auction. In this 
paper, we will consider only the case where the market price is the highest rejected bid.   4 
answer, we turn to experimental data in order to characterize better the outcomes of multi-unit 
auctions. 
 
We therefore analyse a multi-unit auction run into two different “competitive environment” 
scenarios: the first one includes six bidders with small individual demands, the second is 
characterized by two bidders with large individual demands. Aggregate demand and supply 
are  the  same  in  both  scenarios.  We  first  identify  potential  Nash  equilibria  in  bidding 
behaviour and deduct that in both scenarios the auction revenue could potentially fall to zero, 
were  bidders  able  to  coordinate  on  such  equilibria.  We  then  run  controlled  laboratory 
experiments to compare the efficiency outcomes in both scenarios. The main conclusion is 
that  with  constant  competition  degree  (identical  aggregate  demand),  when  the  number  of 
bidders increases while individual demand decreases, there is less strategic bidding (demand 
reduction), therefore leading to higher expected revenue (with a lower variance). However, 
allocation efficiency is not significantly different. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Next section summarises intuitions and literature findings 
based on a specific example which will be mobilized in the experiments. The third section 
describes the experimental protocol. The fourth section presents the experimental results on 
auction  performance.  The  fifth  section  analyses  strategies  in  experiments.  Last  section 
concludes. 
2.  LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1.  Literature findings 
In  the  literature  on  auctions  with  multi-unit  demand,  most  articles  aim  to  compare  the 
performance of different auction formats for a given structure of competition. We focus here 
only  on  the  case  of  the  uniform-price  auction.  The  uniform-price  auction  has  first  been 
considered falsely as the generalisation of the second-price auction in the case of a multi-unit 
auction. As pointed out by Binmore and Swierzbinski (2000), this incorrect analogy has led 
some prominent economists to confusions regarding the incentive effects of uniform-price 
auctions. Indeed, it is a dominant bidding strategy to submit one’s true value in the single-unit   5 
demand  case,  but  when  bidders  have  non-increasing  multi-unit  demand,  they  have  an 
incentive to reduce their demand so as to obtain units at a more favourable price (see, for 
example, Noussair, 1995; Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn, 1998). If we consider the discrete 
case where many indivisible units are put on sale and bidders submit a bid for each unit they 
want, a bidder who desires more than one unit in a uniform-price auction has an incentive to 
shade her bid (bid under her true valuation, i.e. underbidding). There is no bid shading on the 
first unit demanded, but increasing amounts of bid shading occur on subsequent units. The 
intuition behind the incentive to reduce demand is that bidders have market power in the 
uniform-price auction since their bid potentially determines the price they will have to pay. 
Demand reduction reduces seller’s revenue and introduces inefficiencies as buyers with lower 
valued units may earn items in place of buyers with higher values (Ausubel and Cramton, 
2002). 
 
There is a growing literature on this demand reduction phenomenon. There are in particular 
many  experimental  auctions  that  are  conducted  to compare demand reduction in different 
multi-unit auction formats, usually for two identical units: Alsemgeest, Noussair and Olson, 
1998; List and Lucking-Reiley, 2000; Kagel and Levin, 2001; Engelmann and Grimm, 2006; 
Porter and Vragov, 2006. As the theory predicts, clear demand reductions is observed in the 
uniform-price  auction  (even  when  bidders  have  flat  demands).  In  addition,  Engelbrecht-
Wiggans, List and Lucking-Reiley (2006) found that the demand reduction diminishes when 
the number of bidders increases, but does not vanish. 
 
From a theoretical viewpoint, it is difficult to obtain results in a general discrete case (N 
bidders with multi-unit demand competing for K units). Most papers consider special cases. 
The most common studied example is when two units are put on sale and bidders have a 
demand for two units. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998) and Krishna (2002) provide 
characterizations of equilibria in such auction. 
 
If there are two units for sale and two bidders with value vectors X that are identically and 
independently distributed according to the density function f(x) = 2 on c = {x Î [0, 1]² : x1 ³ 
x2}, Krishna (2002, p. 189) proves that b1(x1, x2) = x1, and b2(x1, x2) = 0, i.e. bidding one’s 
true value for the first unit and zero for the second, is a symmetric equilibrium of the uniform-
price auction. Thus, in every realization, each bidder wins one unit and the price is zero! In 
such case, allocative efficiency is not guaranteed (since the private value of the first unit of   6 
one of the two bidders can be lower than the second private value of the other bidder and is 
won however). 
 
Can such equilibrium be extended to a more complicated case where the number of bidders or 
the number of units is strictly greater than two? We will see next that the answer depends on 
the competition structure. 
2.2.  Theoretical predictions for two competition structure scenarios 
To simplify, we restrict the analysis to symmetric bidders. Bidders who participate in the 
auction have the same structure of individual demand, i.e. they want the same number of units 
and  have  decreasing  demand  values  (downward  sloping  demands).  More  precisely,  each 
bidder’s private values are independently drawn from the same distribution and are ordered 
from the highest to the lowest. This distribution and ordering rule is common knowledge. In 
the following experiment we consider a uniform distribution on [0, 100]. In addition, we 
assume that there is neither communication nor any possibility for explicit collusion. 
 
To fix ideas, assume a situation with a total supply of K = 6 units. We study two scenarios. In 
scenario 1, there is a group of six identical bidders with a non increasing demand for two units 
each. In scenario 2, we consider two players with a demand for six units each. In short there 
are six small bidders in scenario 1 and two large bidders in scenario 2. Note that the aggregate 
demand in both scenarios is identical and is equal to 12 units. Since there are only 6 units put 
on sale, the competition degree is 2 in both scenarios. However, the structure of competition 
differs because the size and numbers of bidders are different. Table 1 summarizes information 
on both scenarios. 
 
Table 1 : Summary of the two scenarios 
  Scenario 1 
« 6 small bidders » 
Scenario 2 
« 2 large bidders » 
Number of bidders  6  2 
Individual demand  2  6 
Total demand  12  12 
Competition degree   2  2 
   7 
Our main question is: which scenario is best from the auctioneer’s viewpoint? Which scenario 
leads to the highest seller’s revenue? Which scenario gives the best allocation efficiency? In 
order to answer these questions from a theoretical point of view, we first need to determine 
optimal bidding strategies and auction equilibria.
3 
 
Let’s first consider scenario 1 with 6 small bidders. This scenario bears similarities with the 
Krishna case described above. We also have N = K (N is the number of bidders) and bidders 
still  have  a  demand  for  two  units.  Despite  the  similarities  of  this  game  with  Krishna’s 
example,  we  show  in  Appendix  1  that  we  cannot  obtain  the  same  type  of  equilibrium 
strategies (bid sincere on the first unit and bid zero on the second unit) as soon as N = K > 2. 
Actually, bidding one’s true value for the first unit remains an optimal strategy, but if the 
private value of the second unit is high enough, it is profitable for the bidder to attempt to win 
a second unit by bidding more than zero for this second unit. As a consequence, bidding zero 
for the second unit is not an equilibrium strategy in our scenario with 6 small bidders when 
they bid their true value for the first unit. Nevertheless, note that bidding 100 (or any value 
above) for the first unit and zero for the second unit is a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy 
in scenario 1. In this case, no bidder has a profitable deviation whatever her private values. As 
a result, extreme demand reduction may occur and bidding above one’s highest value for the 
first unit can be justified here. 
 
Let’s now consider scenario 2 with two large bidders having an individual demand of six units 
each, and a total supply of K = 6 units put on sale. Each bidder submits six bids. In this case, 
bidding one’s true values for the first three units and then bidding zero for the last three units, 
by analogy with Krishna’s example, is a Nash equilibrium strategy. Indeed, even in the most 
favourable  realization  (the  bidder  receives  the  highest  possible  value,  i.e.  100  in  our 
experiment,  for  all  six  units)  there  is  no  profitable  deviation.  In  particular,  we  show  in 
Appendix 2 that it is not in the bidder’s interest to deviate and to bid a positive value for the 
fourth bid in the attempt to win a fourth unit when the other bidder bids truthfully on the first 
three units and zero on the other last three units. Moreover, it is also an equilibrium strategy to 
                                                 
3 Note that when bidders have single unit demand, imagine 12 bidders with a demand for only one unit, their 
optimal bidding strategy is to bid their true value (no demand reduction). Thus the expected revenue corresponds 
to the seventh highest value out of twelve and there is allocation efficiency.   8 
bid 100 (or any value above) for the first three units and to bid zero for the last three units. In 
those type of equilibria, the expected price is zero. 
 
To summarize, there are many equilibria in both scenarios. Some equilibria correspond to 
extreme  demand  reduction  and  lead  to  very  low prices  and potential allocative efficiency 
losses. Nevertheless, those equilibria are not undominated equilibria and require some tacit 
coordination among the bidders to be effective. It is therefore not guaranteed that bidders will 
reach them. The problem is that we cannot measure the theoretical degree of optimal demand 
reduction  of  undominated  equilibria  due  to  the  impossibility  to  describe  the  equilibrium 
bidding strategies as closed form expressions (Chakraborty, 2006). Thus, it is impossible to 
give  theoretical  predictions  on  performance  or  to  have  a  clear  benchmark  equilibrium  to 
compare our results with.  
2.3.  Intuitions and hypotheses 
Intuitively we may expect a greater expected revenue in scenario 1 than in scenario 2. There 
are two arguments to justify our intuition. First, in scenario 1 with six small bidders, we 
expect demand reduction only on 6 units since bidders should submit their true value (or 
above their true value) for the first unit; whereas in scenario 2, with two large bidders we may 
observe demand reduction for up to ten units. In other words, we expect less underbidding in 
scenario 1 than  in scenario 2. Thus, on average and if we ignore the amount of bid shading in 
each case, we could expect higher revenue in scenario 1.  Second, if we consider the two large 
bidders  in  scenario  2  as  two  “cartels”  (collusion  among  three  bidders),  it  reinforces 
expectations for lower competitive pressure in scenario 2 and therefore lower revenue for the 
seller compared to scenario 1 (without collusion). These arguments lead us to hypothesis 1. 
 
Hypothesis  1:  For  a  given  competition  degree,  the  expected  price  (and  therefore  revenue 
efficiency) of a uniform-price auction with symmetric bidders is greater when the number of 
bidders increases or equivalently when individual demands decrease. 
 
The  outcome  in  terms  of  allocative  efficiency  is  less  predictable.  Since,  there  is  demand 
reduction on more units a priori in scenario 2, we may think that the risk of misallocation is 
higher in this scenario. However, the risk of misallocation is a priori lower when there are   9 
fewer bidders and the “cartel effect” may suggest the opposite. Indeed, we may think of a 
better allocation efficiency in scenario 2 since the two “cartels” can be expected to allocate 
the units won among their members efficiently. Since arguments run in opposite directions, 
we  are  not  able  to  offer  intuitions  on  which  competition  structure  is  better  in  terms  of 
allocation efficiency and we may speculate that both effects compensate each other. 
 
Hypothesis  2:  For  a  given  competition  degree,  allocative  efficiency  is  not  significantly 
affected by the competition structure, i.e. by the number of bidders or equivalently by the size 
of individual demand as long as bidders have multi-unit demand. 
 
Intuition also suggests that the tacit cooperative outcome (due to strategic bidding and leading 
to a price of zero) is more straightforward and easier to reach in scenario 2 with two large 
bidders  than  in  scenario  1  with  six  small  bidders,  in  particular  when  bidders  cannot 
communicate but when the game is repeated many times as it is the case in our experiments. 
Indeed, when there are only two bidders, they can easily anticipate that one of their bids may 
determine  the  equilibrium price  and  that  they  could  cooperate  with  their  rival by  sharing 
equally the markets between them by bidding a very low price on the fourth unit and the 
following units. There may be no significant demand reduction for the second and the third 
bid, but we might observe a big drop-off in the bid for the fourth unit. In scenario 1 with six 
small bidders, the likelihood for a bidder that his second bid determines the auction price is 
much lower (one chance out of six a priori) and we may expect less strategic bidding. 
In other words, we expect that when the number of bidders increases, bidders act more as 
price  takers  than  as  price  makers,  i.e.  they  act  more  according  to  decision  theory  than 
according to game theory. Since optimal bidding strategies are complex to compute and tacit 
cooperation is more difficult to reach, bidders may presume that the equilibrium price will be 
around the seventh highest value out of twelve, so somewhat lower than 50, whatever they 
bid. From order statistic and our assumptions on the distribution of bidders’ private values, 
the expected value of the seventh highest value out of twelve is: 
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Finally, according to those intuitions on the bidders’ behaviour, we may expect more truthful 
bidding on average in scenario 1 with six small bidders with an auction price around the   10 
seventh highest value. In scenario 2 with two large bidders, depending on whether the pair of 
bidders reaches a cooperative equilibrium or not, we may observe more diversified outcomes. 
As a result, our third hypothesis is that the auction competition structure leads to different 
bidding strategies. 
 
Hypothesis 3: For a given competition degree, bidders bid more strategically, i.e. they bid 
high on first unit(s) and low on last unit(s), when the number of bidders is lower. Thus auction 
results are less predictable (higher standard deviation on auction prices) when the number of 
bidders  is  low.  On  the  opposite, bidders  tend  to bid  closer  to  their  true values when the 
number of bidders increases. 
 
These three hypotheses are tested with an experiment based on the two scenarios. 
3.  EXPERIMENTS 
As presented previously, we set-up experimental uniform-price auctions in which six identical 
units are put on sale simultaneously. The six highest bids are the winning bids. The bidders 
pay a price equal to the seventh highest bid (the first rejected bid) for each unit won. The 
implicit reserve price is zero: bidders can only submit positive bids. This auction game is 
repeated  13  times  in  a  session  with  the  same  set  of players  for  different  value  sets.  The 
equilibrium price is announced to all the bidders before the next auction starts, so they know 
how many units they have won in the period and what is their profit. If there are ties, the unit 
is allocated randomly among the tied bidders. 
 
The first two periods are trial periods to make sure the players understand the game
4. Thus 
only  the  last  11  periods  are  paid  and  used  to  analyse  the  results  of  the  experiments. 
Participants received their accumulated round payoffs (plus a show-up fee of €3.00) at the end 
of the experiment. Excluding the show-up payment, the average earnings per subject were 
                                                 
4 The instructions were read aloud to the whole group and included examples. The subjects’ understanding of the 
game was tested through a short questionnaire and was followed by a time allocated to group questions and 
responses. Protocols and questionnaires are available  on request (Evrard, 2004).   11 
about  €18.10.  Communication  among  the  players  is  made  impossible  during  all  the 
experiment. 
 
A total of 40 students from Montpellier University have participated in the experiments (in 
2004 and 2006). Let’s call G1, G2 and G3 the three groups of bidders who played scenario 1 
and P1, P2 to P11 the eleven pairs of bidders who played scenario 2 (see Table 2). 
 
All private values are randomly drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 100. For 
each of the six players in scenario 1, two values are independently drawn. The highest one is 
for the first unit, the lowest value is attributed to the second unit. In scenario 2, the 6 values 
given to each bidder are ordered from the highest value for the first unit to the lowest for the 
last unit wanted. In both scenarios 156 values are needed for one session (13 periods * 12 
privates values). 
 
Table 2 : Experimental setting 
  Scenario 1 
« 6 small bidders » 
Scenario 2 
« 2 large bidders » 
Total 
Number of students  18  22  40 
Number of sessions  3 
(G1, G2, G3) 
11 
(P1, P2, …, P11) 
14 
Number of auctions  33  121  154 
Number of bids  396  1452  1848 
 
4.  RESULTS ON PERFORMANCES 
We first analysed results to detect learning effects across periods and potential end-of-game 
impacts.  There  is  no  significant  trend  indicating  such  effects  (see  Figures  A1  and  A2  in 
appendix  3).  In  scenario  2,  tacit  cooperative  outcomes,  due  to  severe  demand  reduction 
(strategic bidding), are no more frequent in the last periods than in the first ones. Kruskal-
Wallis  tests
5  on  auction  prices  and  on  all  other  performance  indicators  described  in  the 
following do not allow us to reject the null hypothesis of equality of population across periods 
at the 5% level of confidence, even when we include the two trial periods. In other words, we 
                                                 
5 Kruskal-Wallis test is an extension of the Mann Whitney (rank-sum) test for more than two sub-samples.   12 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the 13 period bids are drawn from the same distribution. As a 
consequence, we do not distinguish periods in the following analysis. Thus, results presented 
in next sections rely on all periods (except the two trial periods). 
4.1.  Performance indicators 
Seller’s revenue 
The  seller’s  revenue  is  six  times  the price  obtained  in  the  auction.  Thus,  to  measure  the 
revenue efficiency of an auction, we simply compare the auction price to the seventh highest 
value, i.e. the price the seller would have received, had all players bid their true values for 
every units. 
 
REseventh =  100
lue highest va seventh 
price auction  ´  
 
However to measure the revenue efficiency, we also compare the revenue obtained to the 
revenue that the seller would get in perfect information and discriminatory pricing: 
 
REinfo =  100
lues highest va six     the of   sum
6   price auction  ´ ´  
 
Allocation efficiency 
Different criteria may be used to measure the allocation efficiency. A perfect efficiency would 
require that the 6 units are attributed to the bidder(s) who has (have) the six highest values. 
First, we can measure the efficiency by the ratio: number of units correctly attributed over the 
number of units to allocate (here 6). 
 
AEnum =  100
6
attributed correctly  unit    of number  ´  
 
However we may want a more accurate indicator, since a wrong attribution may be more or 
less harmful depending on the difference of the bidders’ values. So we also define another 
allocation efficiency indicator: the ratio of the sum of the six values which correspond to the   13 
units that have been won over the sum of the six highest values. The closer to 100%, the 
higher the allocation efficiency. 
 
AEvalue =  100
lues highest va   6





Experimental auction performances are summarized in Table 3 for the two scenarios. Since 
scenario 1 requires 3 times more bidders, we only have 33 observations when there are six 
small bidders, but we have 121 auctions with two large bidders. 
 
Table 3 : Global performance in each scenario 
  scenario 1  scenario 2 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
price  33  39.79  14.16  17  73  121  34.58  17.81  1  90 
seventh  33  41.33  12.07  23  61  121  42.61  13.03  20  84 
REseventh  33  96.15  19.48  60  152  121  83.28  40.60  2  346 
REinfo  33  55.58  16.59  21  86  121  47.26  22.10  1  138 
AEnum  33  90.40  11.81  66.67  100  121  91.40  10.49  62.5  100 
AEvalue  33  98.12  3.05  89  100  121  98.30  3.10  86  100 
 
In the following comments, tests for normality lead us to use non parametric tests to compare 
Table 3 results. Significance is given at the 5% level. 
4.2.  Test of hypothesis 1: revenue efficiency 
As predicted, the expected revenue for the seller is higher in scenario 1 (six small bidders) 
than in scenario 2 (two large bidders). The average auction price is 39.79 in scenario 1 and, as 
expected, is really close to the average seventh highest value. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
does  not allow us to reject the null hypothesis that prices are equal to the corresponding 
seventh highest value in scenario 1 (z = -0.989). Thus, revenue efficiency is relatively high 
(REseventh = 96.15%) when there are six small bidders. In scenario 2, the average auction 
price is only 34.58 and is significantly lower than the seventh highest value (z = -6.876). 
Revenue efficiency is significantly lower (REseventh = 83.28%) than the one in scenario 1 
with  a  two-sample  Wilcoxon  rank-sum  (Mann-Whitney)  test  (z  =  2.724).  The  revenue 
efficiency indicator REinfo is also significantly lower in scenario 2 (z = 2.361). In addition,   14 
standard deviations for the two revenue efficiency criteria are much higher in scenario 2. 
Support for hypothesis 3 will be developed in next section, however, this result is a first 
argument that confirms this hypothesis : auction results are less predictable with two large 
bidders. They depend on the bidders’ ability to reach a tacit cooperative outcome. Indeed, we 
observe that very low prices have been reached in scenario 2, leading to very low minima for 
both revenue efficiency criteria (2% and 1%), whereas the minima in scenario 1 are 60% and 
21%. We also observe an important difference in maximum values which are much higher in 
scenario 2 and prove some aggressive bidding when there are only two bidders. Actually, 
overbidding (at least from some bidders) is found in both scenarios since we observe revenue 
efficiency higher than 100%. This point will be detailed in section 5 on bidders strategies. 
4.3.  Test of hypothesis 2: allocation efficiency 
For  the  allocation  performance,  results  are  relatively  good  in both  scenarios.  There  is  no 
significant  difference  among  scenarios.  Two-sample  Wilcoxon  rank-sum  (Mann-Whitney) 
tests give z = -0.270 and z = -0.515 for AEnum and AEvalue respectively. On average, less 
than  10%  of  the  units  are  attributed  to  bidders  who  have  lower  values.  However,  the 
allocation efficiency in value is still quite high (more than 98% on average) which means that 
the valuation of wrongly won units is not much lower (less than 2% on average) than the 
valuation of the bidders who should have won the 10% of misallocated units. 
Therefore, we have seen that revenue efficiency is lower when small bidders are aggregated 
(or “collude”) to form two large bidders (or “cartels”), however this “cartel effect” does not 
significantly increase allocation efficiency. In this experimental framework, allocation is good 
and does not depend much on the competition structure. This confirms hypothesis 2. 
Before analysing bidding strategies, a quick analysis of  performances by groups or pairs for 
the 11 periods shows two very different outcomes.
6 For scenario 1, based on Kruskal-Wallis 
tests, we can not reject the null hypothesis of equality among the 3 groups composed of six 
subjects at the 5% level of confidence except for the variable REseventh. On the opposite, for 
scenario 2, we reject the null hypothesis of equality among the 11 pairs at the 5% level of 
confidence for every variable (price, REseventh, REinfo, AEnum and AEvalue). In particular, 
one pair (P08) presents very low performances (the average price reached by this pair is 7.64). 
                                                 
6 Result tables are not reported here, but are available upon request.   15 
As we are going to see now, this pair managed to reach a tacit cooperative equilibrium using 
very strategic bidding in most of the periods. 
5.  ANALYSIS OF BIDDING STRATEGIES 
The objective of this section is to test hypothesis 3. We first present global results on bidding 
strategies; we then analyse individual bidding strategies and identify three types of bidders in 
scenario  2;  we  finally  conduct  regression  analysis  using  panel  data  to  explain  bidders’ 
strategies. 
5.1.  Underbidding, sincere bidding and overbidding 
We examine all bids relative to the true value. In scenario 1, we have 396 bids, 198 on the 
first unit and 198 on the second unit. In scenario 2, we have 1452 observations, 242 bids for 
each of the six ordered units. Each pair (value, bid) is plotted in Figure 1 and Figure 2 (except 
16 pairs in scenario 2 because corresponding bids are above 160). Figure 1 shows that in 
scenario 1, bids are correlated to values whereas Figure 2 is more fuzzy, revealing many bids 
at 100 and many at zero. The level of underbidding is limited by zero, but overbidding is not 
limited and we observe some very unreasonable high bids (maximum is 5000). We count 8 
(2%) bids strictly above 100 in scenario 1 and 73 (5%) in scenario 2. 
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Since figures 1 and 2 do not unveil any single clear bidding strategy, we first consider in 
Table 4 the proportion of bidders who underbid (bid < value), bid sincere (bid = value) and 
overbid  (bid  >  value)  by  scenario  and  by  ordered  units.  Naturally  this  results  just  give 
preliminaries  indications  on  bidders’  strategies  since  they  do  not  reflect  the  intensity  of 
underbidding or overbidding. 
 
Table 4 : Proportion of underbids, sincere bids and overbids 
Scenario 1  obs.  underbids  sincere bids  overbids 
Unit 1  198  0.5707  0.2020  0.2273 
Unit 2  198  0.6566  0.1515  0.1919 
All units  396  0.6136  0.1768  0.2096 
Scenario 2  obs.  underbids  sincere bids  overbids 
Unit 1  242  0.2975  0.0537  0.6488 
Unit 2  242  0.3512  0.0413  0.6074 
Unit 3  242  0.4959  0.0331  0.4711 
Unit 4  242  0.7521  0.0165  0.2314 
Unit 5  242  0.7438  0.0372  0.2190 
Unit 6  242  0.6942  0.0992  0.2066 
All units  1452  0.5558  0.0468  0.3974 
   17 
Contrary to our intuitions, bidders underbid on more units in scenario 1 (61,36%, we expected 
50%:  0%  on  the  first  unit  and  100%  on  the  second  unit)  than  in  scenario  2  (55.58%). 
However,  in  scenario  1,  results  are  quite  similar  for  the  first  and  the  second  units. 
Surprisingly, 57% of the bids for the first unit are below the corresponding value, although it 
is a dominant strategy to bid at least one’s value for the first unit. Moreover, almost 20% of 
the bidders bid above their value for the second unit although overbidding for the second unit 
goes against theoretical results. Nevertheless, two third of bidders shade their second bid as 
predicted by the theory. 
 
In scenario 2, we clearly see a different strategy for the first three units and the last three 
units. As predicted, the proportion of bidders who underbid on the fourth unit is the most 
important (75%). But, as in scenario 1, we still observe many bidders (more than 20%) who 
bid above their values for the last three units. Nevertheless, this proportion is much lower than 
for the first three units. Actually we observe quite aggressive bidding for the first units when 
there are only two bidders, as if bidders absolutely wanted to win at least some of the offered 
units. These results confirm hypothesis 3 that bidders are more strategic in scenario 2 than in 
scenario 1 where the proportion of sincere bids is much higher. 
 
To gain more insights into bidders’ behaviour we analyse the difference between bids and true 
values:  V B BminusV - =  measures the degree of over or underbidding. To prevent bias from 
observations with extremely high bids, all bids above 100 are set to 100. Indeed, underbidding 
is limited by zero, since negative bids are not allowed; so in order to analyse underbidding 
and overbidding on the same scale we do as if bidders were not allowed to bid above 100. 
First, results on BminusV from Table 5 confirm previous findings. In scenario 1, bidders are 
relatively sincere, the means of BminusV are close to zero and are not significantly different 
for units 1 and unit 2
7. In scenario 2, on average, subjects overbid on units 1, 2 and 3 and 
underbid on units 4, 5 and 6. With a two sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test, we 
reject the hypothesis that BminusV are the same for the first three and the last three units. In 
addition, the mean of the amount underbid is the highest for unit 4 (-10.68). Again, these 
results support hypothesis 3. 
                                                 
7 Skewness/Kurtosis test for Normality lead to reject the null hypothesis: BminusV is not Normally distributed, 
so we use non parametric tests to make comparisons across scenarios and across first and last units within a 
scenario.   18 
 
Table 5 : Statistics on BminusV with max bid = 100 
scenario 1  obs.  Mean  St. Dev.  Min  Max 
unit 1  198  -1.26  13.72  -37  68 
unit 2  198  -0.27  14.43  -35  79 
scenario 2  obs.  Mean  St. Dev.  Min  Max 
unit 1  242  3.78  15.06  -59  60 
unit 2  242  7.71  17.84  -49  66 
unit 3  242  3.86  21.85  -85  76 
unit 4  242  -10.68  17.41  -82  64 
unit 5  242  -7.80  15.22  -62  64 
unit 6  242  -4.16  11.06  -52  69 
 
5.2.  Types of bidders 
When examining bidding strategies in scenario 1, we observe that bidders have the same 
behaviour for the two units in general: bidders who underbid (overbid) on the first unit also 
underbid (overbid) on the second, and sincere bidders bid their true values (or very close) on 
both  units.  Only  5  players  (28%)  have  a  more  erratic  behaviour  which  is  difficult  to 
categorize. 
 
On the opposite, we can roughly distinguish three types of bidders in scenario 2. First, there is 
a majority of sincere bidders (45%) who bid close to their true values on the first units then 
bid sincere or underbid a little on the last units (see Figure 3). Second, there are bidders, we 
call  them  “strategic  bidders”,  who  significantly  overbid  on  the  first  units,  many  of  them 
bidding 100 or above, and underbid on the last units, many of them bidding zero. We count 9 
such strategic bidders, i.e. 41% of the 22 subjects in scenario 2 (see Figure 4). Finally, as in 
scenario 1, we also observe few bidders (14% in scenario 2) whose behaviour is difficult to 
categorize (see Figure 5). 
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5.3.  Regressions on bidding strategies 
Finally we conduct ordinary least square regressions to explain the bidders’ bids. First, we 
propose  a  simple  linear  model  (1)  which  seeks  to  explain  the  bids  by  the  values  of 
corresponding units. 
i i i V B e b a + + =           (1) 
Then, to compare bidding behaviour in both scenarios, we introduce in model (2) a dummy 
variable ‘last’ (Li). 
i i i i L V B e g b a + + + =           (2) 
with,  in scenario 1:    Li = 0 for unit 1,    Li = 1 for unit 2, 
  in scenario 2:    Li = 0 for units 1, 2 and 3,  Li = 1 for units 4, 5 and 6. 
 
Results are presented in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 : OLS Regression results 
  Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
value (Vi)  0.9601***  0.9479***  1.7548***  1.2999*** 
  (37.57)  (30.30)  (9.49)  (4.32) 
last (Li)    -1.2478    -36.9446** 
    (-0.68)    (-2.08)   20 
_cons  1.5568  2.7613  -19.2743  21.28 
  (1.09)  (1.21)  (-1.64)  (0.94) 
Number of obs.  396  396  1452  1452 
Adj R-squared  0.7813  0.7810  0.0467  0.0489 
t statistics in parentheses   * p < 0.10,  ** p < 0.05,  *** p<0.01 
 
We obtain a coefficient of determination of 78% in scenario 1, but less than 5% in scenario 2. 
However,  the  variable  ‘value’  is  highly  significant  in  both  scenarios.  Adding  the  dummy 
variable ‘last’ in model (2) confirms previous findings. In scenario 1, variable ‘last’ is not 
significant,  thus  the  bidding  strategy  for  unit  one  is  not  significantly  different  from  the 
bidding strategy for the second unit. In scenario 2, the estimated coefficient associated to the 
variable ‘last’ is significantly negative at the 5% level of confidence. Thus, bidding strategies 
for units 1, 2 and 3 display a significant mark-up compared to bidding strategies for units 4, 5 
and 6. 
 
We  conduct  separate  panel  regressions  when  last  =  0  and  last  =  1  in  both  scenarios.  A 
statistical investigation by a F-test shows the rejection of the simple pooled regression and the 
acceptation  of  a  individual-effect  model.  Hausman  test  accepts  the  null  hypothesis  of  the 
absence of correlation between specific effects and regressors at a 5% significance level. We 
chose fixed effect (FE) estimators. Results are reported in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 : Panel regression results with fixed effects 
  Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
  last = 0  last = 1  last = 0  last = 1 
  B1  B2  B1, B2, B3  B4, B5, B6 
value  0.9370***  0.8945***  1.8071***  0.6439*** 
  (32.22)  (23.56)  (3.53)  (30.75) 
_cons  3.4616*  3.1470**  -14.2378  2.0938*** 
  (1.73)  (2.20)  (-0.38)  (3.02) 
Number of obs.  198  198  726  726 
Number of groups  18  18  22  22 
R-squared within  0.8529  0.7561  0.0175  0.5736 
R-squared between  0.3597  0.4962  0.0043  0.0770 
R-squared overall  0.7201  0.6768  0.0140  0.4662 
t statistics in parentheses                         * p < 0.10,  ** p < 0.05,  *** p<0.01 
 
Even if a and b are slightly lower for the second unit, as expected in scenario 1, coefficients 
are not significantly different than the ones estimated for the bids on the first unit. Moreover, 
coefficients of determination stay relatively high in both cases. On the opposite, in scenario 2, 
coefficients are much different and coefficient of determination is over 46% when last = 1,   21 




rd bids separately, bids do not significantly depend on corresponding values in scenario 2. 
These regression results also indicate that the underbidding is more important on last units in 
scenario 2 than the underbidding on the second unit in scenario 1 (0.6439 versus 0.8945) even 
if coefficients associated to the constant are not rigorously the same. 
 
There  is  no  improvement  in  the  models  when  we  add  the  values  of  the  other  units  as 
explanatory variables: 
i i i ki V V B e b b a + + + = 2 2 1 1         in scenario 1 
i i i i i i i ki V V V V V V B e b b b b b b a + + + + + + + + = 6 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1   in scenario 2 
with k = 1,2 in scenario 1 and k = 1 to 6 in scenario 2. 
 
Results are not reported here, but as obtained in previous regressions, only the value for the 
unit corresponding to the bid is significant, except for the first three bids in scenario 2. This 
last result is due to the strategic bidders who overbid systematically on their first units. 
6.  CONCLUSION 
Although multi-unit auctions are widely used in practice and while the multi-unit auction 
literature  is  being  rapidly  enriched  (theoretical  models,  empirical  studies,  experimental 
auctions), no study analyses explicitly the impact of the competition structure on multi-unit 
auction performances. We show with this paper that the competition structure has an impact 
on bidding strategies even when the competition degree is the same. Our experiments indicate 
that, with identical aggregate demand, when the number of bidder decreases while individual 
demand increases, there is more strategic bidding leading to lower expected revenue with a 
higher  variance.  Performance  in  terms  of  allocation  efficiency  is  less  sensitive  to  the 
competition structure. 
 
Therefore, when designing a multi-unit auction, it is important to consider the question of the 
competition structure. Whereas the seller is usually not in capacity to increase the competition 
degree (unless renouncing to sell all his units), we show that if he can determine who is   22 
eligible to bid and what is the size of the unit, i.e. the minimum amount one can bid on, he can 
improve his expected revenue. 
 
Naturally, in the absence of theoretical predictions from auction models, more experimental 
works  need  to  be  done  to  confirm  our  findings.  Moreover,  many  other  questions  remain 
unanswered  and  deserve  attention.  For  example,  what  would  be  the  results  with 
heterogeneous  bidders,  i.e.  when  bidders  do  not  have  the  same  individual  demands?  An 
extension of this work could include a third scenario with one large bidder wanting six units 
facing three smaller bidders each wanting two units. 
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APPENDIX 1 
We consider scenario 1: six bidders have a decreasing demand for two units only. 
To prove that bidding sincere on the first unit and zero for the second unit is not a Nash 
equilibrium in this scenario, we propose a deviation strategy:  
b1(x1, x2) = x1 and  2 ˆ b (x1, x2) > 0  for a sufficiently high value of x2,  
with x1 and  x2  the values of unit 1 and 2 respectively, and bi the bidding strategy on unit i,  
i = 1, 2. 
We look for the optimal  2 ˆ b  when all other bidders follow the strategy: 
b1(x1, x2) = x1 and b2(x1, x2) = 0 " x1 and x2. 
Thus, the deviating bidder’s objective function is to maximize the following expected profit:   24 
[ ] ( ) ( )
2
2 1 2 2 1 2 2 ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ Max  1 Pr ( ) Pr( ) 2 X x X x x X X
b
p b b b b     E = - < - + £ + - E <      
X is the fifth highest bid of his five opponents who bid sincere on their first unit and zero on 
their second unit. X is also the smallest non zero bid of his five opponents. Therefore X is the 
unknown price the bidder will have to pay if he wins two units, i.e. if  2 ˆ b £ X . 
Each bidder receives two values from a uniform distribution on [0; 100]. From the order 
statistics, the density and cumulative functions of x1 (the highest of the 2 received values) are: 
2
(2)
1 ( ) 2
100
x
f x =  and  
2
(2)
1 2 ( )
100
x
F x = . 
The density function of X (the fifth highest value from 5 independent random variables with 
density function  ) (
) 2 (
1 x f ) is: 
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The probability the deviating bidder wins two units is: 
( )
2
2 4 7 8 10 ˆ
(5) 2 2 2 2 2
2 5 2 4 6 8 10 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ Pr ( ) 10 
2 100 100 100 2 100 10 100
X y dy
b b b b b b
b j
 
< = = - + - +     ´ ´ ´   ∫ . 
The expected price if he wins two units is: 
2
3 5 7 9 11 ˆ
(5) 2 2 2 2 2
2 5 2 4 6 8 10 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 4 6 4 ˆ ( ) 10 
3 100 5 100 7 100 9 100 11 100
X X y y dy
b b b b b b
b j
    E < = = - + - +       ´ ´ ´ ´ ´   ∫ . 
The expected profit is then: 
[ ] ( )
2 2 ˆ ˆ
(5) (5)
5 1 2 5 1 2 2 0 0
ˆ ˆ 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 y dy x y dy x x X X
b b
p j b j b       E = - - + + - E <           ∫ ∫ . 
Using Maple software we plot  [ ] p E  with  2 ˆ b on the x-axis going from 0 to 100, for many 
given values x1 and x2. We observe that if x2 is high enough, the expected profit can be higher 
for some  2 ˆ b >0 than with b2 = 0. Therefore, bidding b1(x1, x2) = x1 and b2(x1, x2) = 0 " x1 and 
x2 is not a Nash equilibrium. 
For example, if a bidder receives x1 = 80 and x2 = 70, his profit will be 80 if he follows the 
strategy  b1(x1,  x2)  =  x1  and  b2(x1,  x2)  =  0  as  the  other  five  players  do.  However,  in  the 
following Graph 1, we see that his expected profit will be a little bit higher than 87 if he bids 
around 47 for the second unit. 
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Graph 1 : Expected revenue when x1 = 80 and x2 = 70 
 
Actually,  the  bidding  strategy  b1(x1,  x2)  =  x1  and  b2(x1,  x2)  =  0  "  x1  and  x2  is  a  Nash 
equilibrium when N = K = 2. However, as soon as N = K > 2, there are profitable deviations 
from this type of strategy if x2 is high enough. 
APPENDIX 2 
We consider, scenario 2: two bidders (1 and 2) have a decreasing demand for six units. 
We look for a profitable deviation for bidder 1 when bidder 2 plays: 
bk(x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6) = xk when k = 1, 2, 3; 
bk(x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6) = 0 when k = 4, 5, 6. 
If bidder 1 adopts the same “collusive” strategy, his profit is then x1 + x2 + x3 since he wins 
three units and the price is zero. We wonder if it is in bidder’s 1 interest to win a fourth unit. 
Let’s assume that bidder 1 submits  4 ˆ b  > 0. His objective is to maximize his expected profit. 
[ ] ( ) ( )
4
3 4 1 2 3 4 3 4 1 2 3 4 3 3 4 ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ Max  1 Pr ( 3 ) Pr( ) 4 c x x x c x x x x c c
b
p b b b b     E = - < + + - + £ + + + - E <    
 
c3 is the third highest value out the six values of bidder 2. The density and the cumulative 
functions of c3 are: 
3 2
(6)
3 ( ) 0.6 1
100 100
x x
f x     = -    
   
,   26 
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 
= = - +   ´   ∫ . 
The expected value of c3 (the auction price) when bidder 1 wins four units is: 
4
5 6 7 ˆ
(6) 4 4 4
3 3 4 3 4 2 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ 60 ˆ ( )
100 5 300 7 100
c c yf y dy
b b b b
b
    E < = = - +       ´   ∫ . 
Bidder’s 1 expected profit is then: 
[ ] ( )
(6) (6)
3 1 2 3 4 3 1 2 3 4 3 3 4 ˆ ˆ 1 ( ) ( 3 ) ( ) 4 F x x x x F x x x x x c c p b b     E = - + + - + + + + - E <     . 
Using Maple software we plot  [ ] p E  with  4 ˆ b on the x-axis going from 0 to 100, with values x1 
= x2 = x3 = x4 = 100. From Graph 2, we see that it is not possible to increase the expected 
profit of bidder 1 with  4 ˆ b  > 0. As a result, since there is no profitable deviation even in the 
most favourable case (i.e. when x1 = x2 = x3 = x4 = 100), bidding one’s true values for the first 
three units and zero for the last three units is a Nash equilibrium in scenario 2. 
 
Graph 2 : Expected revenue when x1 = x2 = x3 = x4 = 100 
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